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SOME ABCS OF FEMINIST SEX EDUCATION
(IN LIGHT OF THE SEXUALITY CRITIQUE OF
LEGAL FEMINISM)
LINDA C. MCCLAIN*
This Essay has two aims. First, it offers some guiding principles, or
“ABCs,” for a feminist vision of sex education. Second, in keeping with
this symposium’s topic, “Sexuality and the Law,” the Essay evaluates that
feminist project in light of what I call “the sexuality critique” of legal
feminism—a line of criticism leveled by feminist and post-feminist scholars
against feminist legal theorists’ work on sexuality. The ABCs advanced
here reflect a liberal feminist approach to sex education, which stresses the
three themes of fostering capacity, equality, and responsibility. Such an
approach, the Essay maintains, is better suited for facilitating the
development of young women’s and men’s capacities for responsible sexual
self-government than the abstinence-until-marriage model of sex education
(“abstinence-only”) embraced in the federal welfare law codified as the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.1
“Abstinence-only” sex education reflects a conservative sexual economy.
As put into practice in various curricula funded by the federal government,
such sex education is laden with gender role stereotypes about “his” and
“her” sexuality that reinforce women’s role as sexual gatekeepers.2
This Essay, given the constraints of space, presents a condensed
account of a basic liberal feminist framework for sex education and
contrasts such a framework with the conservative sexual economy of
“abstinence-only” sex education.3 For this symposium, I will address the
* Rivkin Radler Distinguished Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of
Law. B.A., Oberlin College; M.A., University of Chicago Divinity School; J.D., Georgetown
University Law Center; L.L.M., New York University School of Law. I am grateful to
Hofstra Law School reference librarian Cindie Leigh and to my research assistant Krista
Smokowski for valuable help with research. Thanks also to Kathy Abrams, Mary Anne Case,
James Fleming, James Garland, Tracy Higgins, Carlin Meyer, and Cheryl Mwaria for
discussion of some of the ideas in this Essay.
1

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 710, 702-03, 705-08 (2000).

2

See discussion infra Part I.

3

For a fuller elaboration of an approach to sex education that moves “beyond
women as gatekeepers,” please refer to LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES:
FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 256-89 (2006).
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following issue: what implications for sex education—and in particular,
feminist frameworks for sex education—grow out of the sexuality critique?
The gist of this critique, leveled by feminist and post-feminist scholars
against feminist legal work on sexuality, is that feminist legal theory
analyzes sexuality as a site of subordination of and harm to women. As a
consequence, such theory calls for and embraces legal regulation, protection,
and remedy aimed at such harm, but abdicates to others the task of
developing a positive account of sexuality.
Situating her critique as one lodged within legal feminism,
Katherine Franke charges that legal feminists have failed to “theorize
‘yes,’” and instead have reduced sexuality either to dependency (that is,
reproduction, mothering, and caregiving) or to danger (that is, sexual
subordination and sexual harm).4
Stepping outside of feminism, Janet Halley, in a series of writings,
argues that it would be beneficial to those doing “left pro-sex intellectual
and political work,” including feminists, to “Take a Break from
Feminism.” 5 Like Franke, Halley divides legal feminists into those who
focus on “reproduction, care work, work in the paid economy, and related
matters,” and those who concern themselves with “male power and female
subordination in sexuality.”6 Feminism’s commitment to viewing questions
of sexuality through the lens of subordination theory, Halley charges, leads
it to find in every issue, however complex, a basic subordination dynamic in
which M > F, with men always powerful and women always powerless.7
But even as feminism has become “governance feminism,” or, in other
words, has become instantiated in laws addressing such matters as sexual
harassment, sexual violence, and the like, Halley argues that feminism fails
to admit its “will to power” or to recognize the costs that “governance
feminism” imposes on men and other groups.8
This line of critique further contends that feminist legal theory has
failed to generate positive accounts of sexuality. Instead, a cluster of
intellectual and political movements, including “Queer Theory” in
particular, have challenged the subordination paradigm and taken up this

4
See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001).
5

See Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 7
(2004); see also Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 80,
88-89, 94-102 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Janet Halley, Take a Break from
Feminism?, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 57, 65-66 (Karen Knop ed., 2004).
6

Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 5, at 8.

7

See id.

8

See Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 5, at 57, 65-66.
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positive task left undone by feminism.9 Franke and Halley, for example,
claim that legal feminists seek to sanitize or feminize sex by sharply
separating the categories of “desire” and “danger,” thus leaching out of
sexual desire inherent elements of risk and jeopardy.10 Moreover, Halley
argues that, to the extent legal feminists do offer an affirmative vision of
sexuality, it is of a problematic “feminine” sexuality.11
In an earlier exchange published in this Journal, Gender, Sexuality,
and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, Professor Halley engaged in a
thought-provoking dialogue with Professors Brenda Cossman, Dan
Danielson, and Tracy Higgins over the question of whether feminism was
“enough,” in the sense of offering an adequate tool kit to assess matters of
gender, power, and sexuality. 12 In this Essay, I draw on the dialogical
method, proposed by Cossman, of a “feminism after.” This is a method of
feminist legal theory that is enriched by engaging with forms of analysis,
such as “Queer Theory” or Halley’s “Taking A Break from Feminism,” that
do not share feminism’s unrelenting focus on gender and the male/female
dynamic. However, “feminism after” such a critique, Cossman contends,
still has a distinct and valuable perspective to offer by training a gender lens
on matters of sexuality.13 Thus, in this Essay, I consider how analyses of
intimacy and sexuality, arising outside of legal feminism, would critique
and enrich my own analysis. I also ask whether these approaches enrich my
own critique of the “abstinence-only” model favored by the federal
government.
This Essay considers two texts; the first is Intimacy, an anthology
edited by Lauren Berlant,14 which reflects a variety of critical perspectives,
including Queer Theory. I note some striking convergences and divergences
between the sharp critique, in several essays in that anthology, of the
institutions of intimacy and of the human toll exacted by channeling men
and women into marriage in the service of orderly social reproduction and
the vision of marriage apparent in the conservative sexual economy. I also
9

See Franke, supra note 4, at 182-83; Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 5,

at 13-14.
10

See Franke, supra note 4, at 182-83; Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 5,
at 88-89, 94-102 (discussing the “problematic of wantedness”).
11

See Janet Halley, The Politics of Injury: A Review of Robin West’s Caring for
Justice,
1
UNBOUND
65,
70-71
(2005),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/unbound/index.php [hereinafter The Politics of
Injury].
12

See Brenda Cossman et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory
Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601 (2004) [hereinafter Gender, Sexuality, and Power].
13

See id. at 618-24.

14

See INTIMACY (Lauren Berlant ed., 2000).
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raise some questions about how a liberal feminist approach to social
reproduction might mediate between these two stark positions. I then
engage with Halley’s recently published review of Robin West’s book
Caring for Justice, in which Halley critiques West’s articulation of a
“redemptive” “feminine” sexuality. 15 I choose this particular writing by
Halley because I have also reviewed West’s book 16 and can therefore
readily compare my liberal feminist critique of West’s vision of sexuality
with that of Halley. I defend the gender lens of my own approach, noting
some problematic aspects of Halley’s critique, but also conclude that
Halley’s analysis fruitfully opens avenues for further inquiry about
sexuality and sex education. I conclude by raising some questions (for a
more complete airing at the live symposium) about how to address the
challenge of developing feminist conceptions of the place of intimacy,
sexuality, and family that may compete with the vision manifest in the
conservative sexual economy.
I. CONSERVATIVE VERSUS FEMINIST ABCS OF SEX
EDUCATION
The “abstinence-until-marriage” model of sex education reflects the
triumph of a conservative sexual economy: a cluster of ideas about the
proper arrangement of sexuality that seeks to revive and fortify what are
claimed to be traditional moral values and social norms.17 On this view,
young people should be sexually abstinent until marriage. Courtship, rather
than dating, is the pathway to marriage. A critical component of the model
is that girls and women are gatekeepers; they are responsible for the proper
regulation of boys’ and men’s sexuality. In this vision, men and women
differ not only in sexual desire, but in their capacities, needs, and ambitions.
In the conservative sexual economy, marriage is the only proper
site for the expression of sexuality. Heterosexual sex within marriage is the
only normatively acceptable form of sex. Marriage is a necessary institution
for channeling sexual drives (especially those of men) into the constructive
social forms of monogamy, reproduction, and parenting.

15

See Halley, The Politics of Injury, supra note 11 (reviewing ROBIN WEST,
CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997) [hereinafter WEST, CFJ]).
16
See Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin
West’s Caring for Justice, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 477 (1999) [hereinafter The Liberal
Future].
17
The idea of a “conservative sexual economy” is developed in MCCLAIN, supra
note 3, which offers examples of its operation both in “abstinence-until-marriage” sex
education, id. at 256-63, 276-81, and in the courtship movement, id. at 281-89. The book
also argues that the notion of women as gatekeepers, who civilize men through marriage, is
prominent in the marriage movement. Id. at 135-38.
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One conspicuous embodiment of the conservative sexual economy
is the “Abstinence Education” provisions of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the “PRWORA”). Congress
approved federal funding for sex education programs with an “exclusive
purpose” of teaching abstinence. Among the messages the programs must
teach are: “abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage [i]s the
expected standard for all school age children,” “a mutually faithful
monogamous relationship in the context of marriage is the expected
standard of human sexual activity,” “sexual activity outside of the context
of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects,”
and “bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful
consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and society.”18
The governmental embrace of the conservative sexual economy as
the expected national standard for all citizens conflicts with important
public values of sex equality, equal concern and respect for all members of
society (including gay men and lesbians), and respect for reasonable moral
pluralism. Viewing women as gatekeepers is in tension with viewing them
as responsible, self-governing persons. This vision of personal
responsibility places upon women the responsibility for men’s behavior and
men’s sexuality, even as it insults men’s moral capacity and relieves them
of responsibility.
In my recent book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity,
Equality, and Responsibility, I critique this governmental embrace of the
conservative sexual economy and offer an alternative liberal feminist
approach to sex education.19 Such an approach builds on the basic premises
of “abstinence-plus” or comprehensive sex education by combining the
provision of basic information about sexuality and contraception with clear
messages about abstaining from sexual activity and deferring pregnancy
and childrearing until one is emotionally, socially, and financially
prepared.20 But instead of preaching that any expression of sexual desire
other than in marriage is contrary to an expected national standard, the
proposal treats an emerging sense of sexuality and sexual desire as part of
adolescents’ healthy development and helps them develop a sense of
themselves as responsible sexual subjects. I take seriously the feminist
criticism that sex education stresses danger and typically is “missing [a]

18

See 42 U.S.C. § 710 (2000).

19
The summary of the approach offered in this section of the essay draws upon
MCCLAIN, supra note 3, at 256-89.
20

On the effectiveness of such sex education, see DOUGLAS KIRBY, THE NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, EMERGING ANSWERS: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON
PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TEEN PREGNANCY (2001).

68

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 15:1

discourse of desire,” particularly with respect to articulating female
sexuality.21
Two distinct concerns are at play in sex education: how to instruct
youths about the place of sexuality in their current lives, and how to prepare
them for the place of sexuality and reproduction in their adult lives.
Problems such as teen pregnancy and parenthood, the prevalence among
teens of sexually transmitted diseases, and pressured as well as coerced
sexual activity properly lead to a focus upon immediate issues in teens’
lives. But a broader view of the aims of sex education would prepare them
for eventual responsible self-government in their intimate and reproductive
lives as adults.
My approach to fostering sexual and reproductive responsibility
focuses on capacity, equality, and responsibility. It is liberal in emphasizing
affirmative governmental responsibility to foster children’s capacity for
eventual self-government and in addressing obstacles to such selfgovernment. This emphasis on capacity is particularly relevant to
understanding problems of early sexual activity leading to pregnancy and
early parenthood. Slogans like “the best contraceptive is a real future”
express an important point about teen pregnancy, childbirth, and teen
motherhood and fatherhood. Such behaviors often take place in
circumstances of economic deprivation, in which a young person’s life
prospects seem to offer no better option. A firm liberal response is that
fostering sexual and reproductive responsibility is but one facet of the
government’s affirmative responsibility to foster the capacities of such
adolescents. Otherwise, in the words of Dr. Henry Foster, founder of the I
Have a Future Program, “[w]e are culpable as a society” for not helping
teens have any other vision for themselves.22
My approach is also feminist in highlighting that, in addition to
poverty, sex inequality, gender role expectations, and gender stereotypes
may stand in the way of adolescents developing capacities for responsible
self-government and acquiring a sense of personal agency with respect to
intimacy and sexuality. Problems such as sex inequality, domination, and
sexual violence, along with cultural constructions of femininity and
masculinity, constrain young people’s development of a sense of personal
autonomy and responsibility with respect to sexuality. An adequate program
on sexuality and sex education should address salient gender issues that
shape the environment within which girls and boys act and choose. Some of
those issues include (1) cultural scripts about female and male sexuality that
21

See Michelle Fine, Sexuality, Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing
Discourse of Desire, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29 (1988).
22

New Report Details Sexual Trends Among Low-Income Black Urban Youth,
CAMPAIGN
UPDATE
8
(2004),
available
at
http://www.teenpregnancy.org/about/announcements/pdf/UpdateSpring2004.pdf (quoting Dr.
Henry Foster).
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encourage girls to repress sexual desires and teach boys that male
irresponsibility, aggression, and entitlement are natural and inevitable; (2)
the persistence of the sexual double-standard; and (3) approaches to
sexuality that conflate “sex” with sexual intercourse, thus reinforcing the
association of desire with danger and hindering the development of a
broader conception of sexuality that is consonant with developing a sense of
responsible sexual agency.
Education about gender issues would help illuminate how gender
role expectations shape and constrain adolescents’ understandings of
sexuality and responsibility. Such gender education could be an important
resource for young people by helping them better develop their capacities
for responsible sexual agency. As Kathryn Abrams observes, feminist
analyses of sexuality recognize that, even as women face such constraints as
coercion and rigid gender scripts, they nonetheless exercise a capacity for
self-direction and resistance. 23 Rigid gender role expectations harm both
females and males. Men as well as women may be victims of efforts to
police proper gender role behavior. 24 Notably, legislation introduced in
Congress for “comprehensive” sex education would include funding for
education fostering the development of “healthy attitudes and values” about
“gender roles,” as well as “body image, . . . racial and ethnic diversity, [and]
sexual orientation.” 25 Taking my approach, part of this education would
include fostering the capacities of young people to recognize, discuss, and
reflect upon how various cultural and social norms, as well as stereotypes,
shape ideas about gender roles and the other matters listed above. By
contrast, one Congressional investigative report of several curricula funded
under PRWORA found that the representations of male and female
sexuality, as well as of the relative relationship needs of men and women,
“present stereotypes as scientific fact.”26 In such models of “his” and “her”
sexuality, male sexual desire is strong and natural, while female desire is
more slowly aroused and more cultural; men need little preparation for sex,
while women may needs hours of “emotional and mental preparation.”27
23
See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 326-29 (1995).
24

See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 691, 693, 696, 759-63 (1997).
25
See Family Life Education Act, H.R. 768, 109th Cong. § 3(c)(4) (2005);
Responsible Education About Life Act, S. 368, 109th Cong. § 3(c)(4) (2005).
26

MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., U.S. HOUSE OF REP., CONTENT
FEDERALLY FUNDED ABSTINENCE ONLY EDUCATION PROGRAMS 16 (2004), available at
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20041201102153-50247.pdf.

OF

27

Id. at 18 (quoting WAIT Training curriculum); see also SIECUS Reviews FearBased, Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Curricula, http://www.siecus.org/reviews.html
(reviewing the Sex Respect curriculum) (last visited Dec. 22, 2005).
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The gatekeeper role, then, logically falls to girls, who can more easily slow
things down. But this gatekeeper role, against the backdrop of the sexual
double standard, exacts a cost both in terms of women not feeling able to
act on their desire and perceiving themselves as being responsible for male
desire.
II. “FEMINISM AFTER” THE SEXUALITY CRITIQUE
In the dialogue published in this journal, Gender, Sexuality, and
Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, one point of agreement was that, to
date, feminist legal theory has not risen to the task of imagining or
envisioning a realm of female sexuality other than that of subordination.28
Halley contends that one reason is that feminism’s fixation on the
proposition “M > F” constrains feminists to a grim world in which they
must discern that subordination on the basis of gender is at the root of every
problem. 29 Even feminism’s defenders, such as Cossman and Higgins,
acknowledge that feminism stands to gain if it steps outside itself to
consider analyses of sexuality that are not constrained by what Halley calls
feminism’s essentials: a division of the world into male and female, a
premise of female subordination, and carrying “a brief” for females.30 Like
Franke and Halley, Cossman and Higgins recognize that there has been an
outpouring of imaginative work on sexuality being done in other quarters,
especially the field of Queer Theory. In this section, I concur with Cossman
and Higgins as to the value of what Cossman describes as “feminism after,”
feminism enriched by the critique of Queer Theory and other perspectives,
while “retain[ing] a focus on gender as an axis of power.”31 I now step back
from my liberal feminist approach to sex education and consider the
perspectives on sexuality offered in the anthology, Intimacy, and in some of
Halley’s work. I focus on their positive account of sexuality and on how
they might critique and enrich my approach to sex education and shed light
on the conservative sexual economy.

28

See Gender, Sexuality, and Power, supra note 12.

29

See id. at 604-07 (remarks by Janet Halley).

30

See id. at 617-18, 623-24 (remarks by Brenda Cossman); id. at 631-36 (remarks
by Tracy Higgins).
31

Id. at 618, 623.
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A. Intimacy as (Problematic) Experience and Institution: The Intimacy
Collection32
In Intimacy, a book of essays based on an earlier award-winning
issue of the journal Critical Inquiry, the editor, Professor Lauren Berlant,
identifies intimacy as “a special issue” because it implicates both the
personal (or private) desire for “a life” and the public dimension of
“institutions of intimacy.” These institutions are frameworks for
encouraging people to identify “having a life with having an intimate life”
and for regulating and repressing desire. Intimacy is also “a special issue,”
Berlant argues, because of “strong ambivalences within the intimate sphere”
and ambivalences about desire: “utopian, optimism-sustaining versions of
intimacy” may ill fit the institutions of intimacy that organize people’s lives
and fantasies of intimate life may encounter “unavoidable troubles, . . .
distractions and disruptions.”33 Thus, a basic premise of the collection is
that “[c]ontradictory desires mark the intimacy of daily life,” yet these
“polar energies” are “seen not as intimacy but as a danger to it.”34
Society, Berlant argues, deals with these ambivalences and
contradictions by cabining or repressing them. Thus, one life narrative, that
of the heterosexual (marital) couple, is given primacy by the institutions of
intimacy. As a result, “desires for intimacy that bypass the couple or the life
narrative it generates have no alternative plots, let alone few laws and stable
spaces of culture in which to clarify and to cultivate them.”35
But even favored institutions of intimacy face the destabilizing
aspect of desire. Several essays in the collection address the toll taken by
the task of orderly social reproduction. The essays discuss how organizing
sexuality into a narrative about marriage and reproduction based around
heterosexual marital couples can lead to unhappiness, sexual discontent,
adultery, thwarted desires for communication, and the like.36 These couples,
the authors contend, long for a greater imaginative space, for better ways to
envision and live out intimacy. But, as other essays in the volume explore,
persons whose desires for intimacy do not fit this narrative of the marital
couple also need such imaginative space. As Berlant puts it, “[t]o rethink
intimacy is to appraise how we have been and how we live and how we
might imagine lives that make more sense than the ones so many are
living.”37
32

See INTIMACY, supra note 14.

33

Lauren Berlant, Intimacy: A Special Issue, in INTIMACY, supra note 14, at 1-2.

34

Id. at 5.

35

Id.

36

See infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.

37

Berlant, supra note 33, at 6.
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What light does this collection shed on the task of shaping guiding
principles for sexuality/sex education? How might it critique and enrich my
own analysis and illuminate the conservative sexual economy? I emphasize
two themes in the anthology: (1) the cost that orderly social reproduction
exacts from husbands and wives and how desire and sexuality threaten to
destabilize this preferred life narrative of the couple, and (2) the “worldmaking” project of Queer Theory and its challenge to the project of
“national heterosexuality.”
1. The Costs of Orderly Social Reproduction
The argument that harnessing sexuality in the service of orderly
social reproduction exacts a cost in terms of personal happiness and
pleasure is prominent in Berlant’s anthology. Several contributors paint a
grim picture of marriage and its discontents. Do alternative visions of
sexuality and freedom underlie these analyses? Are they of use for a
feminist approach to sexuality and sexuality/sex education?
A vivid portrait of marital misery and of the wish to imagine
another world appears in Laura Kipnis’s essay, Adultery.38 She writes: “If
marriage is society’s container for intimacy, property, children, and libido,
adultery doubles as its dumpster for all the toxic waste of marital strife and
unhappiness . . . .”39 Adultery is appealing because it “unravels” the married
person from the “welter” of “commandments that handcuff inner life to the
interests of orderly reproduction”; it is “destabilizing” because it involves a
person “deeply wanting something beyond what all conventional
institutions of personal life mean for you to want.” 40 Adultery seems to
“allow space for new forms to come into being,” an “unbounded intimacy
outside contracts, law, and property relations.”41
Marriage, in Kipnis’ essay, is a dreary, de-eroticized state. She
refers to the would-be adulterer’s “torpid married body.”42 She scoffs at the
adage that “good marriages take work,” as though marriage is a “domestic
factory policed by means of rigid shop-floor discipline designed to keep the
wives and husbands of the world choke-chained to the reproduction
machinery.”43 Thus, what staying together “for the sake of the children”
means in practice, she argues, is “habituating children to contexts of chronic
38

See Laura Kipnis, Adultery, in INTIMACY, supra note 14, at 9.

39

Id. at 41.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 42.

42

Id. at 9.

43

Id. at 11.
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unhappiness and dissatisfaction; to unmet needs as status quo; to bitching
mothers, remote fathers, and other gendered forms of quotidian misery.”44
What is the liberatory project that Kipnis proposes as an alternative
to such misery in the service of social reproduction? It is not clear. Adultery,
whatever else it is, is “a placeholder for more sustained kinds of
transformation and honesty.” 45 To envision such alternatives, to install
“optimism and desire into ordinary life in place of emotional fatigue and
renunciation,” would require utopian thinking and fantasy.46
Infidelity, one consequence of the strain of orderly social
reproduction, is also the theme of Michael Hanchard’s essay, Jody. His
focus is on representations in black popular culture of “Jody,” an “erotic
scavenger” who “exist[s] at the margins of others’ love relationships” with
“promises to sate unfulfilled, unquenchable desires.”47 Often, Jody is a man
who poaches on another man’s wife while he is away from the home
working to secure material provision for his wife and the household.
Consequently, Jody upsets the political and sexual economy at work. Under
conventional views of masculinity (including black masculinity), material
provision ought to ensure fidelity, respect, and compliance, but the Jody
figure signifies that wage labor may be at odds with fulfilling erotic
desires. 48 As such, Hanchard observes, Jody appears to reflect a clash
between the reality principle (e.g., wage labor, the strain of material
provision) and the pleasure principle (the desire for intimacy, pleasure). He
may also be seen as a “referent for certain female desires” or “an outlet for
satisfaction, frustration, or revenge,” depending on his female partner’s
situation.49
A third essay, Sex and Talk, written by Candace Vogler, speaks of
the strain of orderly social reproduction, not in the form of adultery, but
instead in terms of the diverging paths husbands and wives follow in pursuit
of a common end.50 That end is depersonalized intimacy, intimacy that is
self-forgetting or self-shattering. Focusing on accounts of unhappy wives
and husbands in popular American psychology books, Vogler observes that
the consumers (predominantly female) of such books are the “moral
proletariat” of “exemplary U.S. heterosexuality,” “charged with producing
44

Id. at 46.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 46-47.

47

Michael Hanchard, Jody, in INTIMACY, supra note 14, at 193, 193-95.

48

See id. at 193-206.

49

Id. at 217.

50

See Candace Vogler, Sex and Talk, in INTIMACY, supra note 14, at 48.
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exemplary heterosexual intimacy at home and managing family values for
children.” 51 What are the “gender-typical heterosexual complaints” this
literature reveals? “[C]ase-study wives complain that their husbands won’t
talk, and case-study husbands complain that their wives won’t have sex.”52 I
will not recount all the steps in Vogler’s analysis, but she concludes that
husbands actually seek “refuge from the burdens of heterosexual masculine
selfhood” in the form of “depersonalizing” sex with their wives, “a mode of
intercourse at home that does some violence to their senses of themselves as
husbands, fathers, heads of household, authorities, and so on.” 53 But if
husbands feel safer having sex than talking, wives seek in talk a safe “selfforgetfulness”; they seek “the sort of intimacy with their husbands that they
get from talk with other women,” often called “troubles talk,” “the sort that
allows one to forget who one is for a little while.”54 Vogler’s concluding
prescription for such husbands and wives is “[t]o imagine intimacies that
are neither entirely self-expressive nor strictly self-disrupting.”55
2. The “World-Making” Project of Queer Theory
Some
essays
in
the
Intimacy
anthology
challenge
“heteronormativity” and would decenter the heterosexual couple to open up
space for a broader realm of sexuality. In a provocatively-titled essay, Sex
in Public, Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner speak of the “radical
aspirations of queer culture building,” which include “the changed
possibilities of identity, intelligibility, publics, culture, and sex that appear
when the heterosexual couple is no longer the referent or the privileged
example of sexual culture.” 56 They identify a “core national culture” of
“national heterosexuality,” or “a sanitized space of sentimental feeling and
immaculate behavior, a space of pure citizenship.”57
If sexuality is a central focus of certain strands of feminism, namely
dominance feminism, out of a conviction that sexuality is the foremost site
of women’s subordination, sexuality is, for Queer Theory, “an inescapable
category of analysis [and] agitation,” but for a different reason. Berlant and
Warner argue that sexuality is a central focus because of its role in
51
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heteronormativity. They argue that “heteronormativity” is “a fundamental
motor of social organization in the United States, a founding condition of
unequal and exploitative relations throughout even straight society.”58
To the criticism that they put forth a “radical anti-normativity” that
fails to allow for, or envision, ordinary life, Berlant and Warner respond
that “to be against heteronormativity is not to be against norms” and is not
to repudiate family and children. Rather, their concern is that “the space of
sexual culture has become obnoxiously cramped from doing the work of
maintaining a normal metaculture.”59 Social membership is not available
unless persons can identify with “the heterosexual life narrative.”60 A queer
world-making project would disrupt this life narrative and offer different
visions of intimacy, sexuality, and a good life.
The “world-making project” that Berlant and Warner describe
poses challenges to a heteronormative vision of intimacy that confines
sexuality to—or, perhaps even better, harnesses it in service of—orderly
social reproduction. Instead of relegating the sexual and the erotic to the
private, to the family, and to reproduction, it would disrupt this ordering.
Queer culture, due to both the criminalized and stigmatized status of
homosexuality in society and the linking of the institutions of social
reproduction to the forms of hetero culture, has had to develop “kinds of
intimacy that bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the
couple form, to property, or to the nation.”61 They point out the fundamental
inequality that is part and parcel of heteronormativity: “Heteronormative
forms of intimacy are supported . . . not only by overt referential discourse
such as love plots and sentimentality but materially, in marriage and family
law, in the architecture of the domestic, in the zoning of work and
politics.” 62 By contrast, “[q]ueer culture . . . has almost no institutional
matrix for its counterintimacies.”63
Some proponents of equality for gay men and lesbians might move
from this diagnosis of inequality to advocacy for opening up the
institutional forms that foster orderly social reproduction to gay men and
lesbians: marriage, family life, the rights and responsibilities of parenting,
and the like. Not Berlant and Warner. They seek a more fundamental
transformation of intimacy, not merely “to destigmatize those average
intimacies [of gay and lesbian couples], not just to give access to the
58
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sentimentality of the couple for persons of the same sex, and definitely not
to certify as properly private the personal lives of gays and lesbians.”64
Berlant’s and Warner’s picture of heteronormativity and the
contrasting queer culture suggest that a queer counterpublic holds promise
not only for gay men and lesbians but also for straights. For example, they
note that when a heterosexual couple, whose lives are otherwise governed
by “reproductivity,” can take an interest in sex toys “and other forms of
nonreproductive eroticism,” they are engaging in “queer sex practices” and
“their bodies have become disorganized and exciting to them.”65 By this, I
infer that the authors mean “disorganized” in the sense of temporarily taken
out of the service of orderly social reproduction and put into the service of
pleasure, that is, eroticism that is not simply instrumental to reproduction.
On this broad reading of “queer sex practices,” many heterosexual
Americans do engage in such practices, if the recent government sex survey
reporting rates of intercourse using condoms, oral sex, and anal sex are any
indication.66
3. Sex Education “After” Critiques of Intimacy
Examining the Intimacy reader and, in particular, essays like that
written by Kipnis, which paint a bleak picture of how uneasily the
institution of marriage harnesses sexuality in the service of social
reproduction, provides an additional perspective from which to assess the
conservative sexual economy’s vision of marriage as necessary to channel
otherwise unruly heterosexuality. Indeed, parallels between Kipnis’s
portrait of the fragile state of marriage and certain contemporary arguments
made in favor of marriage promotion and of a constitutional federal
marriage protection amendment that would define marriage, throughout the
United States, as the union of a man and a woman, are striking. Marriage
needs protection, its defenders argue, because the bond between men and
women, although natural, is fragile. Allowing same-sex marriage, the
argument runs, could weaken marriage’s tight nexus between heterosexual
64
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65
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sex, on the one hand, and procreation and parenting, on the other, so that
marriage seems unnecessary.67
The notion that marriage is a struggle comes through strongly in the
recent report from the Council on Family Law, The Future of Family Law:
Law and the Marriage Crisis in North America, which was co-sponsored by
the Institute for American Values.68 Marriage, as envisioned in this report,
is agonistic and “unique” because its main feature is “the attempt to bridge
sex difference and the struggle with the generative power of opposite-sex
unions.”69 Marriage as an institution is far more than a close adult personal
relationship because it encompasses
fundamental facets of [traditional] human life: the fact of sexual
difference; the enormous tide of heterosexual desire in human life;
the procreativity of male-female bonding; the procreativity of
heterosexual bonding, the unique social ecology of [heterosexual]
parenting which offers children bonds with their biological
parents; and the rich genealogical nature of [heterosexual] family
ties.70

The report stresses both the dangers of unregulated heterosexuality and the
fragility of marriage. Marriage “addresses the social problem that men and
women are sexually attracted to each other and that, without any outside
guidance or social norms, these intense attractions can cause immense
personal and social damage.”71 The report makes explicit the importance of
the orderly social reproduction critiqued by Intimacy’s contributors, stating:
“This mutual attraction is inherently linked to the ‘reproductive labor’ that
is essential to the intergenerational life of all societies, including modern
liberal societies.” Without regulation of heterosexuality through “conjugal
marriage,” the “default position” is “multiple failed relationships and
millions of fatherless children,” “too many” fatherless children, men
“abandoning the mothers of their children,” and “women left alone to care
for their offspring.”72
67
For a discussion of these arguments, see Linda C. McClain, “God’s Created
Order,” Gender Complementarity, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L.
(forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter “God’s Created Order”].
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Kipnis stresses that the marital yoke rests uneasily: marital
unhappiness and the “torpor” of the marital body may lead spouses to turn
to third parties, thus threatening the fidelity norm for marriage. Her essay
seems to be an indictment of the constraints of the marital form and a call to
open up space to imagine forms of intimacy not so at odds with erotic
happiness. Marriage defenders contend that marriage is a worthy social
institution that secures happiness, health, and well-being, but argue that
society must shore it up and support it. For example, they oppose expanding
its definition to include same-sex unions, lest this send a message to
heterosexuals that marriage has “nothing to do” with procreation and
children.73
The liberal feminist approach to sex education that I support
embraces neither the agonistic vision of marriage articulated by marriage
defenders nor Kipnis’s grim picture of Eros compromised for the sake of
conscripting husbands and wives into national service for the cause of
social reproduction. Rather, my premise is that sex/sexuality education
stressing themes of capacity, equality, and responsibility aids in helping
people form and sustain, as part of their view of a good life, relationships
embodying mutual agency, desire, and responsibility. Here, a feminist focus
on the lingering hold of gender scripts and gender ideology upon males’ and
females’ development as sexual subjects may help to lessen the “toll”
exacted by orderly social reproduction. Developing the capacities of
children and adolescents to respect and communicate with each other, rather
than viewing the “opposite” sex as fundamentally alien, may help them
develop friendships and prepare them for intimacy. Marital happiness,
particularly for women, bears a relationship to the quality of marriage. As I
elaborate elsewhere, one important component of this is equality, in the
sense of a fair and equal, mutual partnership, rather than an unfair and
hierarchical relationship.74 Moreover, a curriculum that does not exclude
gay and lesbian adolescents and adolescents sorting out their sexual identity
could help all students reflect on what values they believe are important to
personal relationships. Of course, my support of a role for schools in
encouraging reflection on values as part of sex education should not
obscure that parents, families, and other institutions of civil society play an
important role in shaping children’s and adolescents’ values and in
developing their capacities.
Sexual ethics—even apart from how it bears on sex education—is
also a salient subject for adults. What sort of sexual ethics might address
some of the discontent and unhappiness alleged by critics of “national
heterosexuality”? Pondering the substance of a “gay and lesbian sexual
73
I discuss these arguments in MCCLAIN, supra note 3, at 191-96; “God’s Created
Order,” supra note 67.
74
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ethic,” Carlos Ball identifies values of openness, mutuality, and pleasure,
but adds that, because many heterosexuals also emphasize those values,
they could form the foundation of a progressive sexual ethic.75 Ball, who
supports same-sex marriage, argues that, in addition to committed
relationships, other forms of mutual sexual relationships could have ethical
value.76 Further, some scholars, such as Elizabeth Emens, argue that there
could be ethical alternatives to monogamy and that, given the gap between
the ideal and practice of monogamy (vividly sketched by Kipnis),
governmental regulation should not preclude people from exploring such
alternatives as polyamory.77
This Essay will not take up Emens’ specific argument, but simply
notes that one issue such an argument attempts to put on the table is
whether tensions over monogamy warrant a fundamental reconsideration of
its privileged place in the legal system. Even putting this issue on the table
might be a way—as Halley has argued—to shift the focus from gender
subordination as the most salient dynamic in heterosexual marriage to the
tensions arising from the regulatory power of the marital monogamy norm
and how, because of this norm, spouses wield “an amazing power over each
other” to “perform” and “prohibit” infidelity.78 One might further argue that,
because infidelity and extramarital affairs are a frequent reason for divorce,
monogamy is an unrealistic ideal. On the other hand, recent state-wide
surveys on attitudes about marriage and divorce found that both men and
women reported that, by far, the most frequent reason given for divorce—
even more frequent than adultery—is “lack of commitment.” 79 Does it
follow logically that we should dispense with marital commitment as an
unrealistic ideal? Or did Massachusetts’s highest court have it right (in
opening up marriage to same-sex couples) when it stated that “it is the
exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one
75
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another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil
marriage?” 80 There is a liberatory and anti-institutional strain in the
Intimacy anthology, a vision of desire as inevitably dulled and deadened by
duty owed by spouses and parents. A powerful counterargument is that only
by foreclosing infinite possibility in favor of making a commitment to a
specific person, toward whom one develops loyalty and responsibility, is
genuine intimacy possible.81 Moreover, the stark picture of orderly social
reproduction and the war between the reality principle and the pleasure
principle leaves out the personal and social goods growing out of family life.
The theme in the Intimacy collection of “national heterosexuality”
or “exemplary heterosexuality” also enriches analysis of the “expected
national standard,” set forth in the PRWORA, of abstinence from all sexual
activity until marriage. Berlant and Warner’s observation about the absence
of normative institutional frameworks for any form of life other than the
heteronormative script of the marital couple also helps fortify the point that
abstinence-only-until-marriage leaves no room for imagining or validating
lives where desire for intimacy flows toward other life narratives. For
example, gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered young people
continue to experience difficulty developing a healthy sense of selfhood and
identity amidst problems of discrimination and invisibility in high school.82
A majority of parents, however, want teachers to talk about homosexuality
(albeit without taking a stand about whether it is acceptable or wrong).83 It
is encouraging that some public schools do include education about
homosexuality and/or about accepting gays and lesbians and that a growing
number of high schools have after-school clubs (gay-straight alliances) that
bring gay and gay-friendly straight students together. 84 Both of these
developments, however, are targets of conservative groups.85 Sex education
that reinforces a marital, heterosexual national standard leaves out
alternative life scripts. As I argue elsewhere, a regulatory framework that
supports same-sex marriage as well as a kinship registration system for
other forms of committed intimate relationships (whether or not they
80
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included sexual intimacy) would affirm persons’ capacities to form and
establish the terms of relationships, promote equality among families, and
foster responsibility and interdependency by linking relational
responsibilities to rights.86
B. Janet Halley’s Critique of Robin West’s “Feminine” Sexuality
Halley observes that, in West’s book, Caring for Justice,
“patriarchy operates by harming women on every conceivable dimension
but especially in sexuality and reproduction.” 87 Women suffer various
“harms of invasion” (West’s term), which, as Halley characterizes the
argument, “cut women off from themselves; make it impossible for them to
align desire, pleasure, and action.”88 Although West shares MacKinnon’s
diagnosis of the centrality of sexuality to women’s subordination, she,
unlike MacKinnon, also offers a positive vision of sexuality, or, as Halley
puts it, a redemptive vision of women’s sexual virtue. West (following
Adrienne Rich) derives this “entirely feminine sexual ethics,” Halley
contends, from the intimate bonds between girls and their mothers and
among girls. Patriarchy thwarts these intimate bonds. Quoting West, Halley
writes that “a young girl’s natural, early, fierce, loving, erotic and caring
identification with women and girls is shattered by the pervasive patriarchal
institution of compulsory heterosexuality.”89
Halley contrasts the trajectories West paints for male and female
sexual development: as boys enter manhood, they enter a realm of safety
and “state-created and law-created equality,” while “a girl entering
adulthood leaves behind the relative calm, placidity, and equality of young
female companionship and enters a state-created world of sexual
vulnerability and radical inequality.”90 West, Halley contends, shows little
interest in the harms men may suffer. In this worldview, men are phallic
and powerful, while women, their diametric opposites, have selves
wounded by patriarchy.91 This diametricality illustrates what Halley calls
the “Injury Triad”: “female injury + female innocence + male immunity.”92
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How, then, does redemptive female sexuality emerge? For West, on
Halley’s view, it stems from replacing patriarchal sexuality with a
“feminine” sexuality, rooted in a safe haven of girlhood and female-female
intimacy that is “original, innocent, mutual, sharing, giving, affirming.”93
Noting West’s quotation from Luce Irigiray’s This Sex which is Not One,
which reads “[e]rection is no business of ours . . . . Don’t make yourself
erect, you’ll leave us,” Halley characterizes West’s vision both as one of a
“lesbian sensibility, and an entirely feminine sexual ethics.” 94 West’s
cultural feminism, thus, “has a sexual ethics for everybody, derived from
women’s vital, infantile and generative sexual experience:” Indeed,
The naive expressiveness of the aboriginal self, the erotic
disposition to give and receive in mutuality, the happy
embodiedness of the un[a]shamed female form and of the idyllic
symbiosis originally experienced by mother and daughter—this is
the stuff of ethically good sex. It’s got everything that the
invasive harms would erase. And if everyone had sex this way,
the invasive harms would disappear from the face of the earth.95

What’s wrong with this picture? For one thing, Halley contends, it
has a feature “widely characteristic of feminist legal theory today and
highly puzzling if not downright inexplicable: a pervasive lack of interest in
women’s erotic yearning for men and a foreclosure of theoretic space for an
affirmation of men’s erotic yearning for them.”96 This feature is “puzzling”
given that many of the “chief producers” of U.S. feminism are “women
with husbands, women with boyfriends, women who have sex with men,
and women with sons,” yet they fail to articulate or understand “women’s
heterosexual desire for masculinity in men.” 97 Why, Halley asks, have
cultural feminists (and those other theorists who embrace these concepts)
“not been asked to explain how they can excuse or affirm precisely the male
desire which they do desire, and why so many feminists who interdict it
ethically seem to keep going back for more of it?”98
West’s vision of sexuality in Caring for Justice seems to reflect a
shift from a more nuanced reading of women’s desires and experiences to a
view of the “structural subordination of women in heterosexual sexuality.”99
93
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In her often-discussed earlier writing about women’s “hedonic lives,” West
grappled with how to account for some women’s reports of finding pleasure
in erotic domination by men. She proposed to distinguish problematic cases
when such pleasures were rooted in fear from those in which they were
rooted in trust.100 Halley concludes that, in Caring for Justice, West not
only “maps female sexuality” in a way that omits the possibility of this
form of trust, but also omits “any happy heterosexuality for women,”
leaving women with two options: either “an endless sojourn in
heterosexuality under the ubiquitous conditions of patriarchal threat” or
women’s “infantile, lesbian, entirely feminine sexuality—a sexuality of
mutuality, reciprocity, self-affirming integrity, naive embodiment, empathy
and care.” 101 Such feminine sexuality, as Halley interprets West, is the
“fount” of women’s moral virtue and “the source of their authority to
rule.” 102 Translated into legal reform, this feminist governance project
would simply instantiate this feminine sexuality at the expense of other
conceptions of sexuality.
C. Feminist Sex Education “After” Halley’s Critique of “Feminine
Sexuality”
What has engaging with Halley’s critique of West taught me about
my own approach to sex education? First, I did not need to “Take a Break
From Feminism” to find that West’s depiction of how women, constrained
by patriarchy, turn themselves into “giving selves” is too categorical and
leaves insufficient room for women’s agency. But my review of West gives
more credence to her diagnosis of harm than does Halley. Thus, in my own
review of Caring for Justice, I observed that West’s account “certainly gets
something right in suggesting a constitutive role played by fear in women’s
lives; it is undeniable that sexual violence continues to pose a serious
problem to women’s well-being and ability to act as sexual subjects.”103 I
further observed that:
West’s claims that young girls and women take the further step of
managing that fear by becoming giving selves are too general and
unqualified. . . . What is missing in West’s account of sexuality is
the dialectic, spoken of in earlier feminist work on women’s
quest for sexual liberation, between pleasure and danger: that is,
the insight that sexual pleasure is an important component of
100
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women’s liberation and self-determination, but that negotiating
sexual pleasure can be a source of danger, not only because of the
reality of men’s sexual violence but also because of norms and
stereotypes denying that “good” women should or can enjoy sex.
A central theme in West’s work is bringing women’s narratives
into the open to gain a better understanding of their hedonic
lives. . . . Yet her account of women’s sense of terror, and the
severing of will and desire from act, seems out of touch with
contemporary culture, in which heterosexual women and lesbians
use such media as art, literature, music, and film to express a rich
range of ideas and emotions about sexuality. These range from
the seeming embrace of gender ideology of male sexual
entitlement, to active critique of and anger at such ideology, to
various forms of subverting and transforming such ideology. . . .
[R]ather than sweeping claims about fear, a more nuanced
analysis of how cultural ideology about gender, romance, and
sexuality shape both adolescent females and males is necessary if
feminists are to find ways to empower girls and to alter the
cultural ideology of male entitlement and sexual
irresponsibility.104

Like Halley, I also noted a shift from West’s earlier writing on the
possibility of a positive account of women’s sexuality to the stark picture
she presents in Caring for Justice:
From her earliest work in feminist jurisprudence, West hinted at
the possibility of a heterosexuality premised on trust, love, and
pleasure, rather than dominance, fear, and pain. . . . She evidently
all but abandons such a possibility in Caring for Justice. This is
discouraging, for it presupposes a monolithic account of women
as victims instead of a more complex model of the possibility of
agency amidst constraint and of the many ways in which
heterosexual women can and do negotiate sexuality and marriage
to make them better serve women’s well-being. Here, especially,
West needs to engage more constructively with antiessentialism’s call for a more provisional and contextual analysis
of women’s experience.105

This assessment of West indicates that it is possible to lodge an internal
feminist critique about the problems with categorical claims about genderbased injury. But Halley’s emphases and those of this Essay are,
concededly, different. While emphasizing the need to recognize and
104
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theorize women’s sexual agency, I embrace the feminist goal of challenging
cultural norms of male sexual entitlement and irresponsibility with a view
to helping males and females better form themselves as capable and
responsible sexual subjects. I believe this two-fold focus on female agency
and male entitlement is appropriate. As gender scholar Michael Kimmel has
observed, “the sexual gender gap has been closing in recent years, as
women’s and men’s sexual experiences [have] come to more closely
resemble one another’s”; however, “[w]omen’s increase in sexual agency,
revolutionary as it is, has not been accompanied by a decrease in male
sexual entitlement, nor by a sharp increase in men’s capacity for intimacy
and emotional connectedness.”106 Halley’s focus is on the erasure in West’s
account of any positive place for “masculinity” in men. Without knowing
more about what Halley means by “masculinity,” I cannot say whether she
would view my own project as similarly advancing a “feminine” sexuality
at the expense of masculinity.
But I do find Halley’s notion of the Injury Triad helpful for
focusing on how assumptions about powerless women run parallel to
envisioning men as all-powerful and may consequently deter important
work on men’s hedonic lives. The Injury Triad may deter feminists from
having any interest in, or affiliation with, “the boy on the playground” and
his fate.107 In my approach to sex education, I urge attention to how cultural
scripts about gender roles shape adolescent females’ and males’ selfunderstandings. Both adolescent females and males, Kimmel reports, have
“sexual experiences for reasons other than intimacy and pleasure,” a
problem he attributes in significant part to pressures and communication
problems arising out of “gendered sexual socialization” in which the
traditional male sexual script stresses pursuit and victory, and the female
script, controlling the situation and protecting her reputation. 108 But
Kimmel also notes some striking findings about gender difference: when
adolescent males had unwanted sexual intercourse, they were more likely
than females to have done so “because they wanted to get sexual experience,
wanted something to talk about, or wanted to build up their confidence,” or
because “they did not want to appear to be homosexual, shy, afraid, or
unmasculine or unfeminine.”109
Another useful focus of feminist thinking about sexuality could be
to assess the narrowing gender gap between women and men and between
adolescent females and males with respect to heterosexual experience and
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practices.110 Conversely, feminists might also analyze an apparent gender
gap between women’s (eleven percent) and men’s (six percent) respective
rates of sexual experience with same-sex partners and women’s higher rate
(than men’s) of bisexual and same-sex attraction.111 Halley’s discussion of
“feminine” sexuality could be illuminating here. One possible reason for
these differentials is that men were asked about engaging in specific sexual
practices with a male partner (oral or anal sex). Women, on the other hand,
were asked a broader question: “[h]ave you ever had any sexual experience
of any kind with another female?”112 Perhaps, we might glean from Halley,
this different framing of the questions reflects underlying conceptions of
feminine sexuality as fundamentally diffuse, emotional, and relational, and
of masculine sexuality as phallic, specific, and act-oriented.113 Or, as recent
discussions of the so-called “gay cowboy” film, Brokeback Mountain,
suggest, the gender gap could reflect the harsh toll that conceptions of
masculinity take on men’s freedom to develop their sexual identity or
express sexuality that does not take a heterosexual form. 114 Of course,
merely knowing the respective rates at which persons engage in particular
sexual practices does not reveal the interpretation they place on those
practices or the affective dimensions of sexuality. Halley’s urging attention
to interpretive frames other than gender may also help here. Thus, after the
federal government released a recent report on sexual practices of
adolescents and adults in the United States, some analysts discerned
generational differences in understandings of intimacy and sexuality, with
teens differing from adults by viewing oral sex as a less intimate and more
casual act.115
Finally, Halley’s contention that feminism fails to offer an account
of women’s and men’s heterosexual desire is intriguing. Perhaps “Taking a
Break from Feminism” helped Halley to diagnose this absence. Halley also
makes a fair point that feminist models of sexuality may champion a
redemptive “feminine sexuality” that leaves out “the possibly vital and life110
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affirming dimensions of men’s bodily immediacy, phallic drive, and
aggression.”116 But the way Halley seems to mock, both in the review of
West discussed here and in her other critiques of feminism, the feminist
goal of safety in sexuality is troubling. Does it indeed rob sexuality of all its
force, or channel it into a confining “feminine” form, to aspire to a sexual
ethic of respect for bodily integrity and of a prohibition against sexual
assault? When Halley chides feminists for trying to sanitize sex by trying to
separate desire and danger and by insisting on the distinction between
wanted and unwanted sex,117 how might this critique translate into a vision
of sex education? Are there any fundamentals or basic preconditions for
developing sexual agency in which she might find common ground with
feminists? Determination of whether there is such common ground between
feminists and proponents of the sexuality critique would be a valuable path
of inquiry. For there exists an ironic parallel between remonstrations by
Franke and Halley about feminists’ efforts to make sex safe and warnings
by abstinence-only proponents that the only “safe” sex is “saved sex”—sex
within marriage. Although these pro-sex legal theorists would distance
themselves from the abstinence champions who loudly proclaim their own
pro-sex stance, what seems to link them is an underlying vision of powerful
forces at work that are not easily channeled or disciplined. This Essay
suggests that feminism, or, perhaps, “feminism after,” has the resources to
offer a better vision.
III. CONCLUSION
This Essay offered some “ABCs” of feminist sex education as a
counter to the conservative sexual economy reflected in federal funding of
abstinence-only sex education. A liberal feminist focus on capacity,
equality, and responsibility would better prepare young people for
responsible sexual self-government than a “national standard” that treats all
sexuality outside of heterosexual marriage as dangerous and threatening,
and curricula that perpetuate gender role stereotypes about women as
gatekeepers and men as irresponsible. I have also engaged with the
sexuality critique of legal feminism, which argues that it has failed to
articulate a positive vision of sexuality that moves beyond conflating
sexuality with danger. Endorsing the value of a “feminism after”
constructive engagement with critiques of legal feminism and with other
theorizing about sexuality, I considered how certain texts about sexuality
might critique and enrich my own approach to sex education and sexuality
and shed light on the conservative sexual economy. I noted some striking
convergences and divergence between the conservative sexual economy and
116
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more radical accounts of intimacy with respect to the role played by
marriage in containing and confining intimacy in service of orderly social
reproduction. In doing so, I suggested how a liberal feminist approach to
social reproduction might mediate between these two stark positions and
identified fruitful areas for further inquiry.

